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Abstract. Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been pro-
posed as a framework for proof-carrying code (PCC) in which the code
supplier provides a program together with an abstraction (or abstract
model of the program) whose validity entails compliance with a prede-
fined safety policy. The abstraction thus plays the role of safety certifi-
cate and its generation (and validation) is carried out automatically by a
fixed-point analyzer. Existing approaches for PCC are developed under
the assumption that the consumer reads and validates the entire program
w.r.t. the full certificate at once, in a non incremental way. In this ab-
stract, we overview the main issues on incremental ACC. In particular,
in the context of logic programming, we discuss both the generation of
incremental certificates and the design of an incremental checking algo-
rithm for untrusted updates of a (trusted) program, i.e., when a producer
provides a modified version of a previously validated program. By up-
date, we refer to any arbitrary change on a program, i.e., the extension
of the program with new predicates, the deletion of existing predicates
and the replacement of existing predicates by new versions for them. We
also discuss how each kind of update affects the incremental extension
in terms of accuracy and correctness.
1 Introduction
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [11] is a general technique for mobile code safety
which proposes to associate safety information in the form of a certificate to
programs. The certificate (or proof) is created at compile time by the certifier
on the code supplier side, and it is packaged along with the code. The consumer
who receives or downloads the (untrusted) code+certificate package can then
run a checker which by an efficient inspection of the code and the certificate can
verify the validity of the certificate and thus compliance with the safety policy.
The key benefit of this “certificate-based” approach to mobile code safety is that
the consumer’s task is reduced from the level of proving to the level of checking,
a task which should be much simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating
the original certificate.
Abstraction-carrying code (ACC) [2] has been recently proposed as an en-
abling technology for PCC in which an abstraction (i.e., an abstract model of
the program) plays the role of certificate. An important feature of ACC is that
not only the checking, but also the generation of the abstraction (or fixpoint) is
automatically carried out by a fixed-point analyzer. Lightweight bytecode verifi-
cation [12] is another PCC method which relies on analysis techniques (namely
on type analysis in the style of those used for Java bytecode verification [8])
to generate and check certificates in the context of the Java Card language. In
this paper, we will consider analyzers which construct a program analysis graph
which is interpreted as an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of states ex-
plored by the concrete execution. Essentially, the certification/analysis carried
out by the supplier is an iterative process which repeatedly traverses the analysis
graph until a fixpoint is reached. A key idea in ACC is that, since the certificate
is a fixpoint, a single pass over the analysis graph is sufficient to validate the
certificate in the consumer side.
Existing models for PCC (ACC among them) are based on checkers which
receive a “certificate+program” package and read and validate the entire pro-
gram w.r.t. its certificate at once, in a non incremental way. However, there are
situations which are not well suited to this simple model and which instead re-
quire only rechecking certain parts of the analysis graph which has already been
validated. In particular, we consider possible untrusted updates of a validated
(trusted) code, i.e., a code producer can (periodically) send to its consumers new
updates of a previously submitted package. We characterize the different kind
of updates, or modifications over a program. In particular, we include:
1. the addition of new data/predicates and the extension of already existing
predicates with new functionalities,
2. the deletion of predicates or parts of them and
3. the replacement of certain (parts of) predicates by new versions for them.
In such a context of frequent software updates, it appears inefficient to submit
a full certificate (superseding the original one) and to perform the checking of the
entire updated program from scratch, as needs to be done with current systems.
In the context of ACC, we discuss the influence of the different kinds of updates
on an incremental extension to PCC in terms of correctness and efficiency. We
also outline the main issues on the generation of incremental certificates and the
design of incremental checkers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces briefly some notation
and preliminary notions on abstract interpretation and ACC. In Section 3, we
present a general view of incremental ACC. In Section 4 we describe the different
kinds of updates over a program and the way they affect the certification and
checking phases. Section 5 reviews the notion of full certificate and proposes the
use of incremental certificate. In Section 6, we discuss the extensions needed on
a non-incremental checking algorithm in order to support incrementality and we
sketch the new tasks of an incremental checking algorithm. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
2 Abstraction-Carrying Code
Our work relies on the abstract interpretation-based analysis algorithm of [6]
for (Constraint) Logic Programming, (C)LP. We assume some familiarity with
abstract interpretation (see [5]), (C)LP (see, e.g., [9, 10]) and PCC [11].
Very briefly, terms are constructed from variables (e.g., x), functors (e.g., f)
and predicates (e.g., p). We denote by {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn} the substitution
σ, where xi 6= xj , if i 6= j, and ti are terms. A renaming is a substitution ρ for
which there exists the inverse ρ−1 such that ρρ−1 ≡ ρ−1ρ ≡ id . A constraint is a
conjunction of expressions built from predefined predicates (such as inequalities
over the reals) whose arguments are constructed using predefined functions (such
as real addition). An atom has the form p(t1, ..., tn) where p is a predicate symbol
and ti are terms. A literal is either an atom or a constraint. A rule is of the form
H:-D where H , the head, is an atom and D, the body, is a possibly empty finite
sequence of literals. A constraint logic program P ∈ Prog , or program, is a finite
set of rules. Program rules are assumed to be normalized: only distinct variables
are allowed to occur as arguments to atoms. Furthermore, we require that each
rule defining a predicate p has identical sequence of variables xp1 , . . . xpn in the
head atom, i.e., p(xp1 , . . . xpn). We call this the base form of p. This is not
restrictive since programs can always be normalized.
An abstract interpretation-based certifier is a function Certifier: Prog ×
ADom × AInt 7→ ACert which for a given program P ∈ Prog, an abstract
domain Dα ∈ ADom and an abstract safety policy Iα ∈ AInt generates an
abstract certificate Certα ∈ ACert , by using an abstract interpreter for Dα,
such that the certificate entails that P satisfies Iα. An abstract safety policy
Iα is a specification of the safety requirements given in terms of the abstract
domain Dα. In the following, using the same subscript α, we denote that Iα and
Certα are specifications given as abstract semantic values of Dα.
The basics for defining such certifiers (and their corresponding checkers) in
ACC are summarized in the following five points:
Approximation. We consider a description (or abstract) domain 〈Dα,⊑〉 ∈
ADom and its corresponding concrete domain 〈2D,⊆〉, both with a com-
plete lattice structure. Description (or abstract) values and sets of concrete
values are related by an abstraction function α : 2D → Dα, and a con-
cretization function γ : Dα → 2D. The pair 〈α, γ〉 forms a Galois connection.
The concrete and abstract domains must be related in such a way that the
following condition holds [5]
∀x ∈ 2D : γ(α(x)) ⊇ x and ∀y ∈ Dα : α(γ(y)) = y
In general ⊑ is induced by ⊆ and α. Similarly, the operations of least upper
bound (⊔) and greatest lower bound (⊓) mimic those of 2D in a precise sense.
Analysis. We consider the class of fixed-point semantics in which a (monotonic)
semantic operator, SP , is associated to each program P . The meaning of the
program, [[P ]], is defined as the least fixed point of the SP operator, i.e.,
[[P ]] = lfp(SP ). If SP is continuous, the least fixed point is the limit of an
iterative process involving at most ω applications of SP starting from the
bottom element of the lattice. Using abstract interpretation, we can usually
only compute [[P ]]α, as [[P ]]α = lfp(S
α
P ). The operator S
α
P is the abstract
counterpart of SP .
analyzer(P,Dα) = lfp(S
α
P ) = [[P ]]α (1)
Correctness of analysis ensures that [[P ]]α safely approximates [[P ]], i.e.,
[[P ]] ∈ γ([[P ]]α). Thus, such abstraction can be used as a certificate.
Certificate. Let Certα be a safe approximation of [[P ]]α. If an abstract safety
specification Iα can be proved w.r.t. Certα, then P satisfies the safety policy
and Certα is a valid certificate:
Certα is a valid certificate for P w.r.t. Iα iff Certα ⊑ Iα (2)
Note that the certificate can be stricter than the safety specification and it
is only required that Iα is implied by Certα.
Certifier. Together, Equations (1) and (2) define a certifier which provides
program fixpoints, [[P ]]α, as certificates which entail a given safety policy,
i.e., by taking Certα = [[P ]]α.
Checking. A checker is a function Checker: Prog × ADom × ACert 7→ bool
which for a program P ∈ Prog , an abstract domain Dα ∈ ADom and cer-
tificate Certα ∈ ACert checks whether Certα is a fixpoint of SαP or not:
checker(P,Dα, Certα) returns true iff (S
α
P (Certα) ≡ Certα) (3)
Verification Condition Regeneration. To retain the safety guarantees, the
consumer must regenerate a trustworthy verification condition –Equation
(2)– and use the incoming certificate to test for adherence of the safety
policy.
P is trusted iff Certα ⊑ Iα (4)
A fundamental idea in ACC is that, while analysis –Equation (1)– is an
iterative process, checking –Equation (3)– is guaranteed to be done in a
single pass over the abstraction.
3 A General View of Incremental ACC
Figures 1 and 2 present a general view of the incremental certification and incre-
mental checking processes respectively. In Figure 1, the producer starts from an
Updated Program, UP , w.r.t. a previously certified Program, P . It first retrieves
from disk P and its certificate, Cert, computed in the previous certification phase.
Next, the process “⊖” compares both programs and returns the differences be-
tween them, Upd(P), i.e, the program Updates which applied to P results in
UP , written as Upd(P) = UP ⊖ P . Note that, from an implementation per-
spective, a program update should contain both the new updates to be applied
to the program and instructions on where to place and remove such new code.
This can be easily done by using the traditional Unix diff format for coding
program updates. An Incremental Certifier generates from Cert, P and Upd(P)
an incremental certificate, Inc Cert, which can be used by the consumer to vali-
date the new updates. The package “Upd(P)+Inc Cert” is submitted to the code
consumer. Finally, in order to have a compositional incremental approach, the
producer has to update the original certificate and program with the new up-
dates. Thus, the resulting Ext Cert and UP are stored in disk replacing Cert and
P , respectively.
Fig. 1. Incremental Certification in Abstraction-Carrying Code
In Figure 2, the consumer receives the untrusted package. In order to validate the
incoming update w.r.t. the provided (incremental) certificate, it first retrieves P
and Cert from disk. Next, it reconstructs the updated program by using an oper-
ator “⊕” which applies the update to P and generates UP = P ⊕Upd(P). This
can implemented by using a program in the spirit of the traditional Unix patch
command as ⊕ operator. An Incremental Checker now efficiently validates the
new modification by using the stored data and the incoming incremental certifi-
cate. If the validation succeeds (returns ok), the checker will have reconstructed
the full certificate. As before, the updated program and extended certificate are
stored in disk (superseding the previous versions) for future (incremental) up-
dates. In order to simplify our scheme, we assume that the safety policy and
the generation of the verification condition [11] are embedded within the certi-
fier and checker. However, in an incremental approach, producer and consumer
could perfectly agree on a new safety policy to be implied by the modification.
It should be noted that this does not affect our incremental approach and the
verification condition would be generated exactly as in non incremental PCC.
Fig. 2. Incremental Checking in Abstraction-Carrying Code
4 Characterization of Updates
Let us now characterize the types of updates we consider and how they can
be dealt within the ACC scheme in the context of logic programming. Given a
program P , we define an update of P , written as Upd(P), as a set of tuples of
the form 〈A,Add(A),Del(A)〉, where A = p(x1, . . . , xn) is an atom in base form
and:
– Add(A) is the set of rules which are to be added to P for predicate p. This
includes both the case of addition of new predicates, when p did not exist
in P , as well as the extension of additional rules (or functionality) for p, if
it existed.
– Del(A) is the set of rules which are to be removed from P for predicate p.
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we do not include the instructions on where
to place and remove such code in the formalization of our method. We distinguish
three classes of updates: addition, deletion and arbitrary changes.
– The addition of predicates occurs when ∀A, Del(A) = ∅ ∧ ∃A, Add(A) 6= ∅.
– The deletion of predicates occurs if ∀A, Add(A) = ∅ ∧ ∃A, Del(A) 6= ∅.
– The remaining cases are considered arbitrary changes.
Addition of Procedures. When a program P is extended with new predicates
or new clauses for existing predicates, the original certificate Certα is not
guaranteed to be a fixpoint any longer, because the contribution of the new
rules can lead to a more general answer. Consider P add the program after
applying some additions and Certaddα the certificate computed from scratch
for P add. Then, Certα ⊑ Certaddα . This means that Certα is no longer valid.
Therefore, we need to perform the least upper bound (lub) of the contri-
bution of the new rules and submit, together with the extension, the new
certificate Certaddα (or the difference of both certificates). The consumer will
thus test the safety policy w.r.t. Certaddα . Consider the abstract operation
Alub(CP1,CP2) which performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions.
Then, we define Certaddα = Alub(Certα, [[P
add]]α) and submit the incremental
certificate Cert which is defined as the (abstract) difference Certaddα −Certα.
The notion of incremental certificate is the issue of Section 5.
Deletion of Procedures. The first thing to note is that in order to entail the
safety policy, unlike extensions over the program, we need not change the cer-
tificate at all when some predicates are deleted. Consider P del the program
after applying some deletions and Certdelα the certificate computed from
scratch for P del. The original certificate Certα is trivially guaranteed to be
a fixpoint (hence a correct certificate), because the contribution of the rules
was conjoined (by computing the lub) to give Certα and so it still correctly
describes the contribution of each remaining rule. By applying Equation 2,
Certα is still valid for P
del w.r.t. Iα since Certα ⊑ Iα. Therefore, more accu-
racy is not needed to ensure compliance with the safety policy. This suggests
that the incremental certificate can be empty and the checking process does
not have to check any predicate. However, it can happen that a new, more
precise, safety policy is agreed by the consumer and producer. Also, this ac-
curacy could be required in a later modification. Although Certα is a correct
certificate, it is possibly less accurate than Certdelα , i.e., Cert
del
α ⊑ Certα.
It is therefore interesting to define the corresponding incremental algorithm
for reconstructing Certdelα and checking the deletions and the propagation
of their effects.
Arbitrary Changes. The case of arbitrary changes considers that rules can
both be deleted from and added to an already validated program. In this
case, the new certificate for the modified program can be either equal, more
or less precise than the original one, or even not comparable. Imagine that an
arbitrary change replaces a rule Ra, which contributes to a fixpoint Cert
a
α,
with a new one Rb which contributes to a fixpoint Cert
b
α such that Cert
ab
α =
Alub(Certaα, Cert
b
α) and Cert
a
α ⊏ Cert
ab
α and Cert
b
α ⊏ Cert
ab
α . The point is
that we cannot just compute an approximation of the new rule and compute
the lub with to the previous fixpoint, i.e., we cannot use Certabα as certificate
and have to provide the more accurate Certbα. The reason is that it might
be possible to attest the safety policy by independently using Certaα and
Certbα while it cannot be implied by using their lub Cert
ab
α . This happens
for certain safety policies which contain disjunctions, i.e., Certaα∨Cert
b
α does
not correspond to their lub Certabα . Therefore, arbitrary changes require a
precise recomputation of the new fixpoint and its proper checking.
As a practical remark, an arbitrary update can be decomposed into an addi-
tion and a deletion and then handled as the first cases. We have pointed out
the difference because correctness and accuracy requirements are different
in each particular case, as we have seen above.
Example 1. The next example shows a piece of a module which contains the
following (normalized) program for the naive reversal of a list and uses the
standard implementation of app for appending lists:
P0 ≡


(rev1) rev(X, Y) : − X = [ ], Y = [ ].
(rev2) rev(X, Y) : − X = [U|V], rev(V, W), T = [U], app(W, T, Y).
(app1) app(X, Y, Z) : − X = [ ], Y = Z.
(app4) app(X, Y, Z) : − X = [U|V], Z = [U|W], app(V, Y, W).
Suppose now that the consumer modifies P0 introducing two more base cases for
app (e.g., added automatically by a partial evaluator [7]):
(app2) app(X, Y, Z) : − X = [U], Z = [U|Y].
(app3) app(X, Y, Z) : − X = [U, V], Z = [U, V|Y].
The producer must send to the consumer the set Upd(P0 ), composed of the
unique tuple:
〈app(X, Y, Z),Add(app(X, Y, Z)),Del(app(X, Y, Z))〉
where Add(app(X, Y, Z)) = {app2, app3} and Del(app(X, Y, Z)) = ∅, i.e., we are
in the case of an addition of predicates only. Let us name P1 to the program
resulting from adding rules app2 and app3 to P0. Note that these rules do not
add any further information to the program (i.e., the certificate for P0 and P1
would remain the same and, as we will see, the incremental certificate is empty).
Consider now the following new definition for predicate app which is a spe-
cialization of the previous app to concatenate lists of a’s of the same length:
(Napp1) app(X, Y, Z) : − X = [ ], Y = [ ], Z = [ ].
(Napp2) app(X, Y, Z) : − X = [a|V], Y = [a|U], Z = [a, a|W], app(V, U, W).
The update consists in deleting all rules for predicate app in P1 and replacing
them by Napp1 and Napp2. Let P2 be the resulting program.Upd(P1 ) is composed
again of a unique tuple with the following information:
Add(app(X, Y, Z)) = {Napp1, Napp2}
Del(app(X, Y, Z)) = {app1, app2, app3, app4}
In this case, we are in presence of an arbitrary change, and as we will show in
Example 5, the incremental certificate will not be empty in this case (since by
using the abstract domain Def in Example 2, the fixpoint for P2 will change
w.r.t. the one for P1). ✷
5 Incremental Certificates
Although ACC and incremental ACC, as outlined above, are general proposals
not tied to any particular programming paradigm, our developments for incre-
mental ACC (as well as for the original ACC framework [2]) are formalized
in the context of (C)LP. A main idea in ACC [2] is that a certificate, Cert, is
automatically generated by using the complete set of entries returned by an
abstract fixpoint analysis algorithm. For concreteness, we rely on an abstract
interpretation-based analysis algorithm in the style of the generic analyzer of
[6].
The analysis algorithm of [6], which we refer to as Analyze, given a program
P and an abstract domain Dα, receives a set of call patterns Sα ∈ AAtom (or
Abstract Atoms) which are a description of the calling modes into the program,
and constructs an analysis graph [4] for Sα which is an abstraction of the (pos-
sibly infinite) set of (possibly infinite) trees explored by the concrete execution
of initial calls described by Sα in P . Formally, a call pattern A : CP ∈ AAtom
is composed of an atom in base form, A ≡ p(X1, . . . , Xn), and a description in
the abstract domain, CP , for A.
The program analysis graph computed by Analyze(Sα) for P in Dα can be
implicitly represented by means of two data structures, the answer table (AT )
and the dependency arc table (DAT ), which are the output of the algorithm
Analyze. Each element (or entry) in the answer table takes the form A : CP 7→
AP such that, for the atom A, CP is its call description and AP its success
(or answer) description in the abstract domain. Informally, such entry should
be interpreted as “the answer pattern for calls to A satisfying precondition CP
accomplishes postcondition AP”. The dependency arc table is not relevant now,
although it is fundamental in the design of the incremental checking, as we will
see later. All the details and the formalization of the algorithm can be found in
[6].
Our proposal for the incremental checking is that, if the consumer keeps the
original (fixed-point) abstraction Cert, it is possible to provide only the program
updates and the incremental certificate Inc Cert. Concretely, given:
– an update Upd(P) of P ,
– the certificate Cert for P and Sα,
– the certificate Ext Cert for P ⊕Upd(P) and Sα
we define Inc Cert, the incremental certificate for Upd(P) w.r.t. Cert, as the
difference of certificates Ext Cert and Cert, i.e., the set of entries in Ext Cert not
occurring in Cert. The first obvious advantage is that the size of the transmitted
certificate can be considerably reduced. Let us see an example.
Example 2. Consider program P0 in Example 1. The description domain that
we are going to use in our examples is the definite Boolean functions [3], de-
noted Def . The key idea in this description is to use implication to capture
groundness dependencies. The reading of the function x→ y is “if the program
variable x is (becomes) ground, so is (does) program variable y.” For example,
the best description of the constraint f(X, Y) = f(a, g(U, V)) is X ∧ (Y↔ (U ∧ V)).
The most general description ⊤ does not provide information about any vari-
able. The least general substitution ⊥ assigns the empty set of values to each
variable. For the analysis of our running example, we consider the set of call
patterns Sα = {rev(X, Y) : ⊤}, i.e., no entry information is provided on X nor Y.
Analyze({rev(X, Y) : ⊤}) returns in the answer table, AT , the following entries:
(A1 ) rev(X, Y) : ⊤ 7→ X↔ Y
(A2 ) app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤ 7→ (X ∧ Y)↔ Z
The certificate Cert for this example is then composed of the entries A1 and
A2 . Consider now the addition of rules app2 and app3 in P0, i.e., program P1 of
Example 1. The analysis algorithm of [6] returns as Ext Cert the same answer
table AT as for P0, since the added rules do not affect the fixpoint result, i.e.,
they do not add any further information. Thus, the incremental certificate Inc -
Cert associated to such an update is empty. ✷
6 Incremental Checking
Intuitively, an abstract interpretation-based checking algorithm (like the one in
[2]) receives as input a program P , a set of abstract atoms Sα and a certificate
Cert and constructs a program analysis graph in a single iteration by assum-
ing the fixpoint information in Cert. While the graph is being constructed, the
obtained answers are stored in an answer table ATmem (initially empty) and
compared with the corresponding fixpoints stored in Cert. If any of the com-
puted answers is not consistent with the certificate (i.e., it is greater than the
fixpoint), the certificate is considered invalid and the program is rejected. Oth-
erwise, Cert gets accepted and ATmem ≡ Cert.
6.1 Checking with Dependencies
In order to define an incremental checking, the checking algorithm in [2] needs
to be modified to compute (and store) also the dependencies between the atoms
in the answer table. In [1], we have instrumented a checking algorithm for full
certificates with a Dependency Arc Table. This structure, DAT , is not required
by non incremental checkers but it is fundamental to support an incremental de-
sign. The DAT returned by Analyze is composed of arcs (or dependencies) of
the form Ak : CP ⇒ Bk,i : CP
′ associated to a program rule Ak :- Bk,1, . . . , Bk,n
with i ∈ {1, ..n}, where Bk,i is an atom. The intended meaning of such a depen-
dency is that the answer for Ak : CP depends on the answer for Bk,i : CP
′, say
AP . Thus, if AP changes with the update of some rule for Bk,i then, the arc
Ak : CP ⇒ Bk,i : CP
′ must be reprocessed in order to compute the new answer
for Ak : CP . This is to say that the rule for Ak has to be processed again starting
from atom Bk,i, i.e., we do not need to process the part Ak :- Bk,1, . . . , Bk,i−1
because it is not affected by the changes.
In the following, we assume that checker is a non incremental checker such
that, if the call checker(P, Sα,Cert) does not fail, then it returns the recon-
structed answer table ATmem and the set of dependencies DATmem which have
been generated. In such a case, we say that Cert has been checked or accepted. By
the correctness of the checker [2], the reconstructed structures contain exactly
the same data as the answer table and the dependency arc table computed by
the analysis algorithm Analyze(Sα) for the program P .
Example 3. Consider the program P0 in Example 1. Analyze returns, together
with AT , the following dependency arc table:
(D1 ) rev(X, Y) : ⊤ ⇒ rev(V, W) : ⊤
(D2 ) rev(X, Y) : ⊤ ⇒ app(W, T, Y) : ⊤
(D3 ) app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤ ⇒ app(V, Y, W) : ⊤
Intuitively,D2 denotes that the answer for rev(X, Y) : ⊤may change if the answer
for app(W, T, Y) : ⊤ changes. In such a case, the second rule rev2 for rev must
be processed again starting from atom app(W, T, Y) in order to recompute the
fixpoint for rev(X, Y) : ⊤. D1 and D3 reflect the recursivity of rev(X, Y) : ⊤ and
app(W, T, Y) : ⊤, respectively, since they depend on themselves (rules rev2 and
app4 respectively). The detailed steps performed by the algorithm can be found
in [6]. Note that, the checker executed for the call pattern at hand, computes
(and stores) in ATmem the entries A1, A2 in Example 2, and, after traversing
rules rev2 and app4, it stores in DATmem the dependencies D1, D2 and D3. ✷
6.2 Additional Tasks of an Incremental Checker
In order to support incrementality, the final values of the data structures ATmem ,
DATmem and P must be available after the end of the execution of the checker.
Thus, we denote by ATpersist , DATpersist and Ppersist the copy in persistent
memory (i.e., in disk) of such structures. Now, we outline in a very general way
the additional tasks that an incremental checking algorithm (inc check in the
following) has to perform. The complete code of the algorithm can be found in
[1]. It receives as input parameters an update Upd(P) of the original program
P , a set of abstract atoms Sα ∈ AAtom and the incremental certificate Inc Cert
for Upd(P) w.r.t. Cert. The following tasks are carried out by an incremental
checker:
Step 1) It retrieves from memory ATmem := ATpersist , DATmem := DATpersist
and P := Ppersist (stored in persistent memory in a previous checking phase)
and generates Pmem := P ⊕Upd(P).
Step 2) It rechecks all entries in ATmem which have been directly affected by
an update. Concretely, for each A : CP ∈ ATmem , such that A has an entry
in Upd(P), a call to checker(P ⊕Upd(P), {A : CP}, Inc Cert) is generated,
marking the entry as checked (or accepted) A : CP check . This guarantees that
the incremental checking process is done in one pass (i.e., rules used to check
A : CP are traversed at most once).
Step 3) It propagates and rechecks the indirect effect of these changes by in-
specting the dependencies in DATmem . Thus, for all A : CP
check ∈ Inc Cert,
if there exists a dependency of the form B : CPB ⇒ A : CP (mod-
ulo renaming) in DATmem such that B : CPB is not marked as checked,
then a call to checker(P ⊕Upd(P), {B : CPB}, Inc Cert) is generated and
B : CPB is marked as checked. This process is repeated until there are
no dependencies satisfying the above condition. Note that the condition
A : CPcheck ∈ Inc Cert ensures that the answer for A : CP has changed
w.r.t. Cert. Otherwise nothing has to be done (this will allow us to reduce
the checking time w.r.t a full checking process for P and Ext Cert).
Step 4) If it does not issue an Error then it removes from ATmem those entries
corresponding to deleted rules. We can identity them by exploring DATmem .
Concretely, for all A : CP ∈ ATmem , A : CP 6∈ Sα, if there not exists a
dependency B : CP ′ ⇒ A : CP in DATmem then remove A : CP from
ATmem .
Step 5) It stores ATpersist := ATmem , DATpersist := DATmem and Ppersist :=
Pmem .
Our first example is intended to illustrate a situation in which the task performed
by the incremental checker can be optimized such that it only checks a part of
the analysis graph.
Example 4. Consider the addition of rules app2 and app3 to program P0, which
results in program P1 (Example 1). As shown in Example 2, the incremental cer-
tificate Inc Cert associated to such an update is empty. The incremental checking
algorithm inc check proceeds as follows:
Step 1) ATmem and DATmem are initialized with A1,A2 (Example 2) and
D1,D2 and D3 (Example 3) respectively. Pmem ≡ P1.
Step 2) Since app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤ ∈ ATmem and Add(app(X, Y, Z)) is not empty,
then a call to checker(P1,{app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤},Inc Cert) is generated in order
to ensure that the fixpoint is preserved. Now, app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤ is marked as
checked.
Step 3) No checking has to be done since Inc Cert is empty.
Step 4) Nothing is done since app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤ occurs at the right-hand side of
dependency D3.
Step 5) Finally, once Inc Cert has been validated, the consumer stores the an-
swer table ATmem , the dependency arc table DATmem and the program
Pmem in disk with the same values as in Step 1. ✷
Our second example is intended to show how to propagate the effect of a change
to the part of the analysis graph indirectly affected by such update.
Example 5. The update consists in deleting all rules for predicate app in program
P1 of Example 1 (which results in program P2), and replacing them by Napp1
and Napp2. After running the Analyze for P2, the following answer table and
dependencies are computed:
(NA1 ) rev(X, Y) : ⊤ 7→ X ∧ Y
(NA2 ) app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤ 7→ X ∧ Y ∧ Z
(NA3 ) app(X, Y, Z) : X 7→ X ∧ Y ∧ Z
(ND1 ) rev(X, Y) : ⊤ ⇒ rev(V, W) : ⊤
(ND2 ) rev(X, Y) : ⊤ ⇒ app(W, T, Y) : W
(ND3 ) app(X, Y, Z) : X⇒ app(V, U, W) : V
Note that the analysis information has changed because the new definition of app
allows inferring that all its arguments are ground upon success (NA2 and NA3 ).
3
This change propagates to the answer of rev and allows inferring that, regardless
of the call pattern, both arguments of rev will be ground on the exit (NA1 ).
The incremental certificate Inc Cert contains NA3 as it corresponds to a new call
pattern and contains also NA1 and NA2 since their answers have changed w.r.t.
the ones stored in Cert (Example 2). Let us illustrate the incremental checking
process carried out to validate this update.
Step 1) We retrieve from disk the answer table, dependency arc table and the
program stored in Step 5 of Example 4. Now Pmem ≡ P2.
Step 2) Similar to Step 2 of Example 4, but considering the new rules for app.
Step 3) Since we have the dependency D2 ∈ DATmem and app(X, Y, Z) : ⊤ ∈
Inc Cert, a call to checker(P2,{rev(X, Y) : ⊤},Inc Cert) is generated to en-
sure that the new fixpoint for rev(X, Y) : ⊤ is valid. In the checking process,
when traversing the rule rev2, the new call pattern app(X, Y, Z) : X occurs
and it is also validated by calling to checker. When traversing rule Napp2,
the dependency D3 is replaced by the new one ND3 in DATmem , and the
call pattern is marked as checked. Similarly, the dependency D2 is replaced
by the new one ND2 and rev(X, Y) : ⊤ is marked as checked. Now, all call
patterns have been checked and the process finishes.
Step 4) The entry NA2 is removed from ATmem since it does not occur at the
right-hand side of any dependency.
Step 5) The consumer stores the answer table ATmem := {NA1 ,NA3}, the de-
pendency arc table DATmem := {ND1 ,ND2 ,ND3} and the programPmem :=
P2 in disk. ✷
The definition of the algorithm inc check can be found in [1], together with
the proof of the correctness of the algorithm. Informally, correctness amounts
to saying that if inc check does not issue an error, then it returns as com-
puted answer table the extended certificate Ext Cert for the updated program.
Moreover, we ensure that it does not iterate during the reconstruction of any
answer.
3 Note hat NA3 is subsumed by NA2 and we could indeed only submit NA2 . The
incremental checking algorithm should be modified to search entries which are equal
or more general than the required one.
7 Conclusions
Our proposal to incremental ACC aims at reducing the size of certificates and
the checking time when a supplier provides an untrusted update of a (previously)
validated package. Essentially, when a program is subject to an update, the in-
cremental certificate we propose contains only the difference between the original
certificate for the initial program and the new certificate for the updated one.
Checking time is reduced by traversing only those parts of the abstraction which
are affected by the changes rather than the whole abstraction. An important
point to note is that our incremental approach requires the original certificate
and the dependency arc table to be stored by the consumer side for upcoming
updates. The appropriateness of using the incremental approach will therefore
depend on the particular features of the consumer system and the frequency of
software updates. In general, our approach seems to be more suitable when the
consumer prefers to minimize as much as possible the waiting time for receiving
and validating the certificate while storage requirements are not scarce. We be-
lieve that, in everyday practice, time-consuming safety tests would be avoided by
many users, while they would probably accept to store the safety certificate and
dependencies associated to the package. Nevertheless, there can sometimes be
situations where storage resources can be very limited, while runtime resources
for performing upcoming checkings could still be sufficient. We are now in the
process of extending the ACC implementation already available in the CiaoPP
system to support incrementality. Our preliminary results in certificate reduc-
tion are very promising. We expect optimizations in the checking time similar
to those achieved in the case of incremental analysis (see, e.g., [6]).
Acknowledgments
This work was funded in part by the Information Society Technologies program
of the European Commission, Future and Emerging Technologies under the IST-
15905 MOBIUS project, by the Spanish Ministry of Education under the TIN-
2005-09207 MERIT project, and the Madrid Regional Government under the
S-0505/TIC/0407 PROMESAS project. The authors would like to thank the
anonymous referees of WLPE for their useful comments.
References
1. E. Albert, P. Arenas, and G. Puebla. An Incremental Approach to Abstraction-
Carrying Code. Technical Report CLIP3/2006, Technical University of Madrid
(UPM), School of Computer Science, UPM, March 2006.
2. E. Albert, G. Puebla, and M. Hermenegildo. Abstraction-Carrying Code. In Proc.
of LPAR’04, number 3452 in LNAI, pages 380–397. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
3. T. Armstrong, K. Marriott, P. Schachte, and H. Søndergaard. Boolean functions for
dependency analysis: Algebraic properties and efficient representation. In Springer-
Verlag, editor, Static Analysis Symposium, SAS’94, number 864 in LNCS, pages
266–280, Namur, Belgium, September 1994.
4. M. Bruynooghe. A Practical Framework for the Abstract Interpretation of Logic
Programs. Journal of Logic Programming, 10:91–124, 1991.
5. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract Interpretation: a Unified Lattice Model for
Static Analysis of Programs by Construction or Approximation of Fixpoints. In
Fourth ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 238–252,
1977.
6. M. Hermenegildo, G. Puebla, K. Marriott, and P. Stuckey. Incremental Analysis of
Constraint Logic Programs. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and
Systems, 22(2):187–223, March 2000.
7. N.D. Jones, C.K. Gomard, and P. Sestoft. Partial Evaluation and Automatic Pro-
gram Generation. Prentice Hall, New York, 1993.
8. Xavier Leroy. Java bytecode verification: algorithms and formalizations. Journal
of Automated Reasoning, 30(3-4):235–269, 2003.
9. J.W. Lloyd. Foundations of Logic Programming. Springer, second, extended edi-
tion, 1987.
10. Kim Marriot and Peter Stuckey. Programming with Constraints: An Introduction.
The MIT Press, 1998.
11. G. Necula. Proof-Carrying Code. In Proc. of POPL’97, pages 106–119. ACM
Press, 1997.
12. K. Rose, E. Rose. Lightweight bytecode verification. In OOPSLA Workshop on
Formal Underpinnings of Java, 1998.
